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NEOLIBERALISM AND THE REVIVAL OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES:  
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ABSTRACT 
Agricultural cooperatives have seen a comeback in sub-Saharan Africa. After the 
collapse of many weakly-performing monopolist organizations during the 1980s and 1990s, 
strengthened cooperatives have emerged since the 2000s. Scholarly knowledge about the 
state-cooperativǮǯǤBased on new 
ǯǡhis article discusses the political economy ǯ
cooperative revival. The authors argue that ǯ   ǯ renewed 
support is framed in largely apolitical terms, which obscures the contested political and 
economic nature of the revival. In the context of neoliberal restructuring processes, state 
and non-state institutional support to democratic economic organizations with substantial 
re-distributional agendas remains insufficient. The political-economic context in Uganda Ȃ 
and potentially elsewhere in Africa Ȃ contributes to poor terms of trade for agricultural 
cooperatives while maintaining significant state control over some cooperative activities to 
protect the status-quo interests of big capital and state elites. These conditions are unlikely 
to produce a conflict-free, substantial and sustained revival of cooperatives, which the new 
promoters of cooperatives suggest is underway. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Against the background of persistent rural poverty, inequality, and increasing concerns 
over food security in the context of environmental change, agriculture has received 
renewed attention as a key sector for inclusive development in sub-Saharan Africa 
(henceforth Africa). However, articulations that emphasise the social importance and 
economic potential of agriculture are mixed with a sense  Ǯ-ǯ ȋ,  ? ? ? ?ȌǮ-ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ-scale 
agriculture continues to be central in Africa, with approximately 80% of farms being 
smaller than two hectares (NEPAD, 2013). The neoliberal restructuring of African 
agriculture through structural adjustment programmes from the 1980s onwards had 
debilitating effects on smallholders who experienced reduced access to finance, 
technologies and supporting infrastructure (Kydd & Dorward, 2004). Tǯ
(1994) claim at the time that the recommended focus on pricing policy stimulated       ǲ     
factors [caused by reform-related reductions in public sector investment] do not pose 
significantly greater constraints to supply response in Sub-Saharan Africaǳ (148). This 
assumption disregarded the importance of non-price factors for agricultural growth in 
Africa (Cornia et al. 1992), and up to today, production in the region has failed to catch 
up with Asia and Latin America (FAOSTAT, 2015; World Bank, 2007). 
 
Neoliberal restructuring processes in African agriculture in the 1990s were accompanied 
by the dismantling rather than reform of weakly performing, government-run 
cooperatives, but recent studies illuminate a cooperative revival in parts of Africa since 
the late 1990s (Develtere, Pollet & Wanyama, 2008; Pollet, 2009). This revival, which has 
seen cooperatives operating as private sector actors in competition with domestic and 
international firms, is potentially significant for inclusive rural development in the 
region. As a major form of permanent economic organization, cooperatives may provide 
a platform for smallholders to address the dysfunctional socioeconomic effects of 
structural adjustment and defend their interests vis-à-vis stronger economic actors and 
the state (Wedig, forthcoming 2018). Through bulk sales, as well as the pooling of 
resources to access processing technology and services, cooperatives can strengthen ǯ      producers, because buyers are more 
willing to engage in direct negotiations if farmers can offer larger output volumes at 
constant quality.  ǯ  ǡ many cooperatives are able to produce 
secondary-processed coffee (green beans), which allows them to export directly to 
international roasters. Smaller cooperatives utilize local grading and milling services, 
while some larger organizations own secondary-processing facilities. This stands in stark 
contrast to non-organized small producers, who sell unprocessed coffee cherries or 
primary-processed beans, either to middlemen or to subsidiaries of international buyers. 
Given the continued importance of agricultural commodities as a major source of export 
earnings in large parts of Africa, cooperatives can also strengthen the ability of small 
producers of export crops to defend their interests vis-à-vis the state. 
 
Given these characteristics of agricultural cooperatives, their recent revival in parts of 
Africa raises the question whether the newly-formed and revived cooperatives in the 
region can function as an organized response to some of the socio-economic and political-
economic Ǯǯ, as described by Brenner 
and Theodore (2002). Such a response may weaken the hegemony of neoliberal ideology 
in agricultural policies and in discourses on economic development more generally by 
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challenging first, depictions of the status quo as a self-regulating, free-market society that 
creates equal opportunities and benefits for all actors, second, the apparent inevitability 
of big capital led economic development, and third, ǲer of the state which Ǯǯ Ǯǯǳȋ
 & Nowell-
Smith, 1971, p. 12). As organizations with democratic organizational structures that 
represent significant parts of a large rural electorate, cooperatives can potentially protect 
their members against coercive state power by providing a platform to influence 
institutional change processes at different government levels. In the absence of effective 
unionization in African agriculture, cooperatives are the single most important form of 
economic organization to address some of the power imbalances in the sector and defend 
the interests of small producers Ȃ many of whom depend on agricultural wage labour in 
addition to farming. 
 
The potential role of cooperatives to address structural inequality in African agriculture 
has so far received little attention from policy makers. International donors have tended 
to ignore the political economy of cooperative growth and have promoted cooperatives Ȃ 
in a distinct departure from decades of de-facto dismissal Ȃ as a largely apolitical 
instrument for inclusive rural development (Bateman, 2015; UN, 2013; Agarwal, 2010; 
Deininger & Liu, 2009; Wanyama, Develtere & Pollet 2008; Birchall, 2004)1. Aid-
dependent governments have tended to embrace the new and significantly donor-driven 
discourse of cooperatives as an instrument for rural poverty reduction through modest 
redistribution. At the same time, there remains a lack of scholarly knowledge about 
contemporary state-cooperative relations and the political economy of the cooperatives 
revival, including conflicts of cooperatives with the state and economic competitors. This 
article contributes to closing this gap by discussing the political economy of ǯ
cooperative revival based on ǯ. The one-country 
case study provides an in-depth empirical analysis of growth conditions for cooperatives  Ǯ  ǯ, (or Ǯ-in-ǯǡ Ǯǯǡ  , 2014; Harrison, 2010), which is embedded in inherited 
institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and political struggles 
(Brenner & Theodore, 2002). By extending the inter-disciplinary debate on the 
contradictory (in)coherence and embedded nature of neoliberalism (Cahill, 2014; Cahill, 
Edwards & Stilwell, 2012) to African agriculture, the discussion captures important 
aspects of the current political economy of rural development in the region.      
 
The Ugandan study shows how the political and economic conditions for cooperative 
growth embody ǲǳǡwhich is caused amongst others by a ǲǡǳȋ& Theodore 2002, p, 352; see 
also Bruff, 2014). As smallholders organize to address inequalities caused by or 
intensified under neoliberal political practice, the Ugandan state regularly responds with 
interventions that seem to interfere with the activities of weaker economic actors Ȃ 
rather than offering outright support Ȃ while shielding stronger actors, such as large 
agricultural investors, from competition. Studies on cooperatives, in Africa and 
elsewhere, have so far largely failed to address the effects of corporate power, and of state 
protection for the interests of big capital, on cooperative operations and growth. Instead, 
                                            
1 For a noteworthy exception on Latin America see Dinerstein (2013).  
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th   ǯ   without acknowledging that the conflict of 
interests between neoliberal economic policy and cooperatives goes beyond the false 
dichotomy of a supposedly non-interfering state model vs. a supportive developmental 
state (see, e.g., Bateman 2015 [Ecuador, Columbia], Golob, Podnar & Lah, 2009 [EU], 
Nannyonjo, 2015 [Uganda], Wanyama, 2009 [Kenya]). Some more critical studies have 
shown how the hybrid functions of cooperatives create tensions within capitalism (Levi 
and Devis 2008), and how organizations with a significant redistributive agenda are co-
opted by the state (Dinerstein, 2013). 
 
We argue that the current political and economic conditions in Uganda and elsewhere in 
the region are unlikely to produce a conflict-free, substantial and sustained revival of 
cooperatives if widespread cooperative activities potentially threaten the closely linked 
interests of big capital and state elites in African export agriculture. ǯ 
agricultural modernization strategy of the 2000s to mid-2010s largely bypassed 
cooperativesǯ and concentrated on creating a favourable business environment for 
large domestic agro-businesses and transnational investors. Rural poverty reduction was 
addressed by promoting the growth of medium-sized farmers (often portrayed as ǮǯȌ, but cooperatives received little attention as economic actors that can 
potentially advance economic democratization. Bilateral FDI negotiations between the 
state and transnational corporations (TNCs) are shrouded in secrecy, but the evidence 
presented below indicates that the Government of Uganda (GoU) pursues strategies of 
liberalized investment to advance and protect corporate interests, even if these push 
small producers out of agricultural processing and export activities. These dynamics 
directly affect the nature of the cooperative revival.  
 
We present findings from two separate studies of the political and socio-economic      ǯ  2, which are of wider 
relevance to the region (Wedig, 2012; Wiegratz, 2016). Coffee is a major export crop in 
11 African countries3 (FAOSTAT, 2016), but many smallholders have been unable to 
benefit from increasing global demand for certified and speciality coffee4 (Ecobank 2014; 
Wedig, forthcoming 2018). In Uganda as well as elsewhere in the region, neoliberal 
restructuring processes have reshaped the economy, polity, and society (UNECA, 2003; 
Hickey, 2013; Wiegratz, 2016, 2009). However, coffee cooperatives have long formed 
part of the social, political and economic fabric of Ugandan society (Bunker, 1987, 1983; 
Kyazze, 2010; Kyamulesire, 1988) and the severe decline or collapse of formerly 
monopolistic cooperatives in the 1980s-1990s did not end economic organization among 
smallholders (Asiimwe & Nahamya, 2006; Asiimwe, 2002; Beijuka 1993).  One of the 
formerly monopolistic organizations revived its activities in the 2000s, and new, 
economically viable cooperatives were established starting in the late-1990s.5  
 
                                            
2 Field research was conducted in Uganda between 2008 and 2010, with follow-up research in 2012, 2013 
and 2015. 
3 ǡǡǡǡǡǡ
ǡǯǡǡǡ
Madagascar.  
4 See e.g. National Coffee Association USA (www.ncausa.org), The Specialty Coffee Association of America 
(www.scaa.org) and Europe (www.scae.com) and The International Coffee Organization (www.ico.org). 
5
 As of 2015, 16,587 cooperative societies (of which 3,131 are SACCOs) are reportedly registered by the 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives. Some are in agricultural marketing (944), others are active 
in energy, water, health, housing, transport, horticulture, tourism, handcrafts, wine production, irrigation, 
livestock and diary (New Vision 2016).  
 5 
Data was generated through a survey among 330 small coffee producers and coffee sector 
wage workers (Wedig, 2012), and more than 200 semi-structured interviews and focus 
group discussions with small producers, wage workers, traders, middlemen, cooperative 
leaders, civil society organizations, NGOs, donor organizations, government officials, 
journalists, academics and managing staff of domestic and transnational buyers (ibid.; 
Wiegratz, 2016). Participant observation was conducted on family farms, field processing 
stations and factories and markets over the course of one year. The ethnographic 
research focu   ǯ  -growing districts6, which provide a 
proto-typical area for the study of cooperatives due to the presence of economically-
viable cooperatives founded post-liberalization and the previously-existing cooperative 
that had held a coffee trading monopoly for Eastern Uganda. 
 
 
COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL 		ǯ
  
Agricultural cooperatives in Africa have served different economic and political functions 
throughout the colonial, post-independence (early 1960s to early 1980s) and structural 
adjustment periods (Birchall, 1997; Bunker, 1987; Derr, 2014; Porvali, 1993). Colonial 
regimes introduced cooperative models that replicated their domestic cooperative 
structures to facilitate production for the metropolis (Schwettmann, 2014; Wanyama et 
al. 2008; Develtere, 1994)7. During the struggle for independence and thereafter, many 
cooperatives, despite their colonial roots, provided a platform for defending non-elite 
interests against colonial regimes, international economic actors, and a non-indigenous 
domestic capitalist class (on Uganda, see Kabuga & Batarinyebwa, 1995; Kyamulesire, 
1988; Mamdani, 1976). In East Africa in particular, cooperatives helped to challenge the 
power of Asian merchant capitalists by promoting black Africans as cooperative leaders, 
and enabling accumulation among African rich peasants who transferred surpluses to 
petty trade leading to the rise of an African commercial class alongside Asian merchants. 
Rural and urban black elites also utilized cooperative structures for personal enrichment 
(see, e.g., Aminzade 2013; Asiimwe 2013, Asiimwe 2002). 
 
Post-independence, cooperatives became part of a strategy of government control over 
export revenues from agricultural production, which reflected the need to finance 
industrialization, increase food security and assert control over fragmented societies 
(Ghose, 1983; Sandbrook, 1985). This increased the already heavy burden placed on 
cooperatives by expecting them to contribute to political and socioeconomic goals, 
including participation, self-help, welfare, and distribution (Lele, 1981). Cooperatives 
with monopolies in agricultural processing and marketing protected producers from 
international price fluctuations, but the necessity to finance industrialization efforts from 
agricultural profits meant that prices paid to producers were often below world market 
prices, and re-investments into the rural production infrastructure remained low. Due to 
structural inequalities in the integration of newly independent African nations into the 
global economy, ǯ terms of trade remained unfavourable, and the focus of 
state support on cooperative administrators often fuelled organizational governance 
problems, including political patronage, internal power struggles, and inefficient 
resource use. Thus, the mixed socioeconomic outcomes of cooperatives in the post-
                                            
6 Mbale, Sironko, Bududa, Manafwa and Kapchorchwa. 
7 Cooperatives in Africa had few links to pre-colonial forms of economic cooperation. Ethiopia, without a 
history of colonial rule, borrowed from international experiences for developing cooperatives. 
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colonial developing world (UNRISD, 1975) may have been partly ǲunfavourable 
conditions, rather than to inadequacy of the approach itselǳ (Braverman et al. 1991, 27). 
 
Weak cooperative performance was turned into a near terminal crisis with the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms from the late 1980s onwards. Based on the critique 
of state-led agricultural development (Bates, 1981) and a perceived dichotomy between 
private- and public-sector led provision of critical services to agriculture, cooperative 
institutions were dismantled. International donors concentrated on the critique of 
parastatal organizations involved in agricultural marketing and input supply (World 
Bank 1982, p. 40-56). While limited public sector investment, such as fertilizer subsidies, 
was recognized as helpful to stimulate growth, government control over marketing 
processes was dismissed as a hindrance to development due to the alleged proliferation 
of inefficiencies in parastatals (ibid.). Thus, the assault on cooperative institutions was 
realized as an implicit part of structural adjustment programmes that dismantled the 
systems of state control erected by African governments post-independence. As such, it 
was later defended by the World Bank as a necessary step in a process aimed at getting ǲǳǣǲ
development paradigm that gave the state a prominent role in production and in ǳǡwhich was seen to cause ǲǳȋ
Bank, 1994, p. 20).   
 
The dominant perspective taken by international donors on cooperatives during the first 
neoliberal reforms during the 1980s reflected the almost exclusive focus of structural 
adjustment programmes on domestic factors of development. While largely ignoring 
external limitations to cooperative success in post-colonial Africa, internal organizational 
factors, including mismanagement and limitations to democratic governance, were seen 
as central reasons for weak cooperative performance. However, rather than focusing on 
the existence (and elimination) of gender- and class-based inequalities within 
cooperatives (Goyal, 1966; Lin, 1990; Peek, 1983), the dominant discourse on 
agricultural reforms echoed the World Bank driven critique of State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs), which correlated state ownership and state monopolies on trade with 
politicisation, inefficiency and the waste of resources (Galal, 1991; Kikeri, Nellis &  Shirley 
1992; Short, 1984). In a similar vein to that wholesale rejection of SOEs as an instrument 
of economic development, the decline of cooperatives during the early 1990s was 
regarded as an inevitable outcome of an inherently inefficient form of economic 
organization that was based on excessive government regulation (see, for example, Baffes, 
2003; Hussi, Murphy, Lindberg & Brenneman, 1994).  This view disregarded earlier 
critiques of the idea that private enterprises are inherently more efficient in allocating 
resources (Papandreou, 1952), and it portrayed corporate power as essentially apolitical.  
 
In Uganda and throughout the region, new and economically viable cooperatives have 
been formed since the late 1990s, and some formerly monopolistic organizations are 
operational again (Boesen & Miiro, 2004; Develtere et al. 2008; Kyazze, 2010; Pollet 
2009;  Wanyama, Develtere & Pollet, 2009).  ? ? ? ?ǲ   ǳ ȋ, 2002, p. 266) are no longer applicable. 
However, cooperatives face unfavourable terms of trade in agricultural markets in which 
a small number of TNCs dominate the value chains for agricultural inputs and to a large 
extent also for outputs. As Bargawi and Oya (2009, p.  ?Ȍǡǲthis dominance allows 
them to pass their costs and risks onto local producers while retaining for themselves the 
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ǯ        ǳǤ The dismantling of the central 
marketing board during the ǯ has allowed price 
fluctuations in international markets to be transmitted directly to small producers 
(Newman, 2009). Neoliberal reforms have weakened the institutional conditions for ǯ economic organization by reducing government capacities to support rural 
financial services, technology transfer, and agricultural production infrastructure. These 
public sector cuts have been underpinned by an ideology that promotes increasing capital 
concentration in the private sector as a pathway to economic development, thereby 
diminishing the policy space of ǯ cooperatives, which relied on public sector 
support to the agricultural production and marketing infrastructure. 
 
As a result of the political-economic effects of neoliberal reforms on African agriculture, 
including the advancement of TNCs and domestic firms with connections to state elites, ǯcooperative revival emerges as a contested political and economic process, 
but the dominant accounts of international donors and African governments fail to 
acknowledge this. The renewed strength of cooperatives can support collective action 
among a fragmented and largely destitute peasantry, which lacks effective organizational 
forms to defend its interests, but the official political rhetoric of new support for 
cooperatives is shaped amongst others by an apolitical portrayal of cooperatives as 
instruments of rural poverty reduction that do not challenge the status quo. This rhetoric 
makes references to the hybrid (social/business) functions of cooperatives; the actual 
barriers against achieving this outcome under neoliberal policies are disguised. The 
Ugandan evidence indicates that both state and donors remain sceptical of a cooperative 
revival Ǯǯ
of permanent economic organizations as a platform for collective action to pursue 
structural change in agricultural export markets, including changes in power relations. 
Thus, state support to cooperatives focuses for instance on savings and credit 
cooperatives (SACCOs), which allow members to modestly improve agricultural 
production output or cover expenses unrelated to farming, but these micro-credit 
systems neither offer sufficient finances nor the necessary organizational structure to 
enter secondary-processing and export activities. They do, however, allow the state to 
channel money to local groups prior to elections or to promote public support for 
particular rural development initiatives that may or may not be supported by 
cooperatives. This sort of politics has reportedly weakened the strength and 
sustainability of various SACCOs (e.g. through misappropriation of funds) and many have 
closed or merely exist on paper (Action Aid Uganda et al. 2013).  
 
These introductory observations indicate that the reality of the revival dynamic is 
complex, nuanced, and ambiguous Ȃ characterised by conflicting interests and power 
asymmetries between groups and among a heterogeneous peasantry. An analysis of ǯrecognise the socio-economic and political contexts 
in which it takes place. As the literature on cooperatives shows, the interests of state and 
economic elites and related power dynamics have always shaped ǯ outcomes 
in historically-specific ways. Albrecht (1996) describes cooperative financial groups that 
helped Czechs and Germans during the late 1800s to purchase national property in a 
political competition over economic dominance. Here, cooperatives became instruments 
of nationalist political activity, maintained by elites seeking to maintain their economic 
power. Peal (1988), also writing on imperial Germany, shows how the Raiffeisen bank 
that was founded to preserve communal cooperation challenged by centralized legal 
Agricultural Cooperatives Under Neoliberalism, JAC 
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structures was displaced by capitalism:  under increasing pressure to compete, Raiffeisen 
cooperatives needed support from and were eventually co-opted by the state. Garrǯ
(2007) analysis of Spanish cooperatives in the early 20th century describes how the state 
withdrew support to economically viable organizations as mass political power in rural 
areas was perceived as a threat to centralized state power, leaving only cooperatives with 
large numbers of middle-income farmers to survive. 
 
THE MAINSTREAM DEBATE ON THE COOPERATIVE REVIVAL 
Before discussing the empirical evidence on coffee cooperatives in Uganda, we review a 
major argument about current cooperative development, which has been instrumental in 
constructing a dominant perception of cooperatives as instruments of self-help and social 
entrepreneurship, but not as a form of collective action to push for structural change 
against the interests of big capital and state elites. This argument assumes a shared 
interest of African governments in the reduction of rural poverty and inequality as the 
driving force behind political support for a cooperative revival. According to this view, 
state officials, spurred by the need to advance inclusive growth, support cooperative 
development alongside efforts to attract FDI and create a favourable business 
environment for TNCs. The global literature on the social and solidarity economy 
acknowledge ǯ  in advancing political empowerment, but neither the 
potential nor the actually existing conflicts ǯ
and the interests of big capital and state elites are directly addressed (see, e.g. Fonteneau, 
2015; ILO, 2011; Nannyonjo, 2015; UN, 2014). Instead, growth limitations are exclusively 
explained by internal organizational constraints (see, e.g., Millstone, 2015) and the 
depiction of state-cooperative relations is one in which the state treats cooperatives as 
non-political organizations that operate as vehicles of economic empowerment of a 
homogenously-poor peasantry.8 Neither socio-economic inequalities among small 
producers, nor the conflictual relations between cooperatives and TNCs are recognised.  
 
This apolitical representation of cooperative development ignores conflicting interests 
between cooperatives and the state, including  ǯ  to prioritize ǯ
gains over competing domestic cooperative needs. It disregards the inherent competition 
between cooperatives and TNCs that aim to increase value capture by purchasing 
unprocessed commodities from fragmented and disorganized producers. The 
representation of cooperatives as uncontroversial instruments of economic 
empowerment in global commodity chains essentially negates the potential of ǯ organizations to challenge the power of concentrated buyers, which 
represents a clear conflict of interests with TNCs and larger domestic buyers. The political 
influence of transnational buyers on agricultural policy, including policy and state 
practices regarding cooperatives, is likely to advance structural inequalities that ǯ 
for poverty reduction. State-cooperative relations can be particularly conflict-laden in 
cases where cooperatives (i) compete with companies that are at least partially owned or 
informally supported by officials9, (ii) pursue an explicit political-economic agenda, e.g. 
                                            
8 For a noteworthy exception in recent donor literature, see UNDP (2016), which argues first, that the role 
of government in the revival of agricultural cooperatives in Uganda needs to be reviewed and second, that 
is necessary to distinguish between desirable government support and government patronage and control.  
9 The opposite may be evident too, when firms compete with cooperatives that are partly owned by state 
officials. 
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regarding the desirable policy mix, or (iii) have broader social effects by promoting 
political mobilisation against state and ruling class interests.  
 
Overall, the mainstream argument portrays the promotion of a cooperative revival as a  
win-ǯǡ
conflicting objectives between relevant interest groups. Economic actors who benefited 
from reduced cooperative activities after neoliberal reforms - TNCs, domestic buyers, 
local intermediaries, and their political backers - are assumed not to engage in activities 
to limit the renewed growth of cooperatives. This is unlikely, because cooperatives 
directly threaten the interests of these actors by seeking to purchase, process and export  ǯ . In agricultural sub-sectors in which small-scale agriculture is 
widespread, cooperatives have a competitive advantage based on their superior ability 
to establish and maintain long-lasting relations with small producers, which are designed 
to provide support in exchange for exclusive sales rights. Thus, cooperative growth 
potentially limits the availability of unprocessed coffee and of contract farmers for TNCs 
and domestic firms, while also putting local traders and intermediaries (hereafter: 
middlemen, as the intermediaries in Uganda are exclusively men) out of business. 
Furthermore, economic organization among small producers may weaken the ability of 
TNCs and larger domestic firms to dominate price setting or to minimize the non-price 
benefits (e.g. free transport services and trainings) that are offered to small producers in 
exchange for exclusive buying rights.  
 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS TO COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT  
Whether cooperatives succeed in realising economies of scale, increased productivity, 
improved market access and price premiums for members depends on internal 
organizational and external political and economic factors. Internal factors, most notably 
governance structures, directly affect inequality among members and membership 
access (Wedig 2013, 2016). External factors Ȃ the existence of supportive state and non-
state institutions, the structure of domestic and international commodity markets, and  ǯ business strategies Ȃ are the focus of the evidence  ǯ
coffee sector that is presented below. ǯ
has altered the conditions for cooperative growth through the cut-down of state support, 
political pressure against aspects of cooperative organization, and a focus on the creation 
of a favourable FDI climate. Overall, the domestic political environment indicates the 
existence of powerful interests towards a limited, not an extensive and sustained 
cooperative revival. Throughout Africa, rapid liberalization reforms have tended to 
advance the interests of large domestic and foreign agricultural commodity buyers (FAO, 
2010, UNCTAD, 2009, OECD, 2008). In ǯ coffee sector, a small number of TNCs 
achieved dominant control over export markets in the 1990s (Ponte, 2001, 2002). In 
Uganda, the coffee market shares of the top-ten companies continuously remained above 
70 per cent since the late 1990s, with six TNCs controlling 64.55 per cent of total exports 
in 2014 (UBOS, 2010; UCDA, 2013).10.  
 
Reduced state support to rural financial services proved a major disadvantage for 
cooperatives. ǯ Cooperative Bank was found insolvent by Ernst & Young in 1998 
and closed down in 1999 when the government was unable (and/or unwilling) to inject 
                                            
10 ǯ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ? ? ? ?Ȁ ?ȋ, 2010). 
Agricultural Cooperatives Under Neoliberalism, JAC 
 
 10 
new capital (Bossa, 2003).11 The ǯclosure amounted to a permanent reduction of 
rural financial services and significant barriers  ǯ -payments to 
members. Attempts to address this problem include the promotion of savings and credit 
groups (SACCOs) by the Uganda Cooperative Alliance (UCA) (Goodwin-Groen & Bruett, 
2004; New Vision, 2015) and the introduction of a government-run warehouse receipt 
system, which provides loans against crop-based certificates. However, the service range 
and outreach of SACCOs still lags behind those of the Cooperative Bank, and the 
warehouse system continues to face implementation challenges, including long waiting 
lists and corruption (Peoples 2006; interviews with farmers). Under these conditions, 
even small costs present entry barriers to cooperative membership12, making the low but 
immediate payments by TNCs for unprocessed coffee attractive. The inability to invest in 
production and marketing infrastructure further weakens the competitiveness of 
cooperatives.  
  
Corporate Strategies as a Constraint to Cooperative Growth  
To ensure a regular supply of high-quality coffee, TNCs ǯfollow a 
pragmatically progressive approach to their relations with smallholders. The objective is 
to enhance their legitimacy as a business partner, because in the immediate post-reform 
period, competition between buyers had intensified exploitative and deceptive business 
practices vis-à-vis producers. Deceit, generally conducted by middlemen who work for 
larger buyers, still continues (Wiegratz, 2016, 2010), but some TNCs have started to offer 
improved price transparency and limited non-monetary benefits, such as free crop pick-
up in selected villages.  
 
Kyagalanyi13 is a major example of this operational strategy. By 2009, the company had 
bought or rented all primary-processing field stations   ǯ -
growing districts and rented much of ǯ largest processing-factory. Both, the 
field stations and the factory were previously owned by the formerly monopolistic Bugisu 
Cooperative Union (BCU), and the purchase and rental of these assets, which are 
perceived as semi-public goods by many producers, was widely seen as controversial. In 
response to ǯcriticism, the company promotes the notion of collaboration and 
common interest with producers through the establishment of so-called ǯ groups, 
which are organized to establish long-lasting relations with producers who sell 
unprocessed coffee. These groups have the same size as primary cooperative unions (25 
to 30 producers) and are promoted by corporate fieldworkers in a language reminiscent 
of that used by cooperative leaders, although they have none of the organizational 
functions of a cooperative union. Extension services are limited to occasional technical 
skills trainings for tree pruning and harvesting. Neither the engagement of growers in 
primary-processing, nor the strengthening of horizontal organizational structures is 
supported.  
 
The decision of many smallholders to enter these groups and sell their unprocessed crops 
to Kyagalanyi or other TNCs are overwhelmingly economic. Throughout Eastern Uganda, 
producers emphasised that without additional income sources, the costs of coping with 
delayed payments caused by cooperative bulk-selling are prohibitive. ǯ lack 
                                            
11 One state informant highlighted the key role of the World Bank in the reform-related decline of 
cooperatives, e.g. via a creation of apparent ǯǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
12 Such as registration fees and contributions to credit and saving groups. 
13 The Ugandan branch of ED&F Man. 
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of savings and ǯpre-payments thus directly affect 
cooperative growth. The local standing of TNCs among smallholders tends to be 
problematic, despite an acknowledgement among sections of those farmers who sell 
directly to the subsidiaries of TNCs that price politics tend to be transparent and the 
limited benefits, such as free produce transport from centrally-located villages, are 
reliable.14 Reasons for this include the tension-laden historical relationship between 
foreign investors and Ugandans, and the reliance of TNCs for most of their transactions 
with smallholders on middlemen, who have a problematic reputation among producers. 
Another reason, which is likely to be relevant beyond Uganda, is the knowledge of many 
smallholders Ȃ certainly those who are organized in cooperatives and thus have access to 
some education on global commodity value chains Ȃ that ǯ ies of vertical 
integration excludes them from value-adding processing activities (interviews with 
smallholders).  
 
The State Ǯǯ as a Hindrance to Cooperative Growth 
In addition to intense competition with large buyers, the political environment has 
become harsher for ǯcooperatives since the implementation of neoliberal 
reforms. The weakening of state institutions responsible for supporting cooperatives has 
undermined the ǯ ability to function effectively. Donor-driven interventions and 
presidential initiatives to support smallholders since the late-1990s failed to balance the 
reduced institutional support (van Bussel & Nyabuntu, 2007; New Vision, 2013; 
Nyabuntu, 2006; OPM, 2005; Tanburn & Kamuhanda, 2005, The Observer, 2014). Some 
initiatives explicitly promoted only particular types of cooperatives, for instance savings 
and credit associations, to address rural poverty and low agricultural productivity. This 
support for limited forms of economic organization stops short of strengthening 
cooperatives with a significant redistributive and economic agenda and instead, arguably, 
focuses on minimizing the potential for social discontent in poor rural areas while 
ensuring some level of crop production.  
 
In recent years, Uganda has been characterised as a semi-authoritarian democracy with 
significant levels of patronage, personal rule, Presidentialism, and corresponding de-
institutionalisation (Mwenda, 2007; Tripp, 2010,). The country has undergone increased 
securitisation and militarisation as the government responded to heightened protest and 
opposition to its rule. These dynamics have affected rural politics and the political 
economy of agricultural development accordingly. An example is the governmentǯ 
political discourse that associates some cooperatives with rebellious behaviour (i.e. doing ǮǯȌǡwhich is seen as detrimental for socio-economic development, national unity, 
and security. Thus, producers report that district-level government officials publicly 
discourage cooperative membership. Primary cooperative meetings must finish before          Ǯǯǡ   
serious consequences of persecution. As a NUCAFE (National Union of Coffee 
Agribusinesses and Farm Enterprises) fieldworker noted:  ǲ      Ǥ 	ǡ  ǯ  
objectives, but we organised meetings with the local government to explain our activities. 
Today, they still discourage the formation of groups [primary cooperatives] in their Ǥǳ 
 
                                            
14 Notably, some middlemen reported in-transparent TNC price and purchasing practices (Wiegratz, 2016). 
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Parts of ǯ current agricultural modernization strategy also directly obstruct 
cooperative development by promoting vertical organizational structures among 
smallholders. A key example is the presidential initiative for the Ǯ-farmers-ǯǤIn 
2008, the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) started to re-direct 
agricultural subsidies to individual producers who are selected by local government 
committees to serve as Ǯdemonstration farmersǯ (Joughin & Kjaer, 2010, p. 70). The 
selected producers tend to be government supporters, whose economic power at the 
local level is boosted by gaining control over agricultural inputs and machinery. This 
approach weakens cooperatives by increasing ǯ dependency on 
demonstration farmers, who potentially become powerful ǮǯǤ ǡ  Ǯ-farmers-ǯ    permanently 
reduce the voice of producers in the distribution of public sector support while tightening 
political control over a large rural electorate (ibid.).   
 
The cooperative revival  ǯ therefore takes place in a political and economic 
climate that poses considerable challenges to the development of collective action. First, 
widespread poverty among small producers results in short-term economic planning that 
limits participation in cooperative bulk-selling. Second, the dominant power of TNCs 
indicates oligopsony rather than Ǯǯ and Ǯ-ǯagricultural markets. Third, 
due to their superior market control, local middlemen and TNCs are able to maintain the 
status quo of limited selling options for small producers. Fourth, sections of the 
government seem to be to some extent opposed towards a significant expansion of 
economically viable and politically independent cooperatives. Instead, it supports a Ǯǯǣ one that poses little threat to existing patterns of 
accumulation and distribution in agriculture and to the wider political economy.  
 
 
Fighting it out with the State? Three ǯevival  
We discuss data from two producer cooperatives: the Eastern Ugandan Gumutindo Coffee 
Cooperative Enterprise (hereafter Gumutindo), which was established post-liberalization,   ǯ   ǡ established in 1954, which was in 
severe decline in the early 2000s, but has revived its business activities in the late 2000s. 
Our third case study is the nation-wide Uganda Cooperative Alliance (UCA), which is the ǯand provides direct member services in addition to 
advocacy and lobbying for the cooperative movement in Uganda. 
 
All three organizations provide training, logistical support, internal auditing, supervision 
and marketing services for members through secondary-level organizational units 
(Kapiriri, 2008, interviews), but apart from this, UCA, Gumutindo and BCU pursued very 
different growth strategies. While both UCA and BCU focused on political lobbying and 
direct negotiations with the state to secure political support and minimize state control, 
we argue that only BCU engaged in activities to politicize producers and strengthen their 
political-economic agency in order to mobilise the group determination and unity 
necessary to launch and sustain a cooperative revival under adverse political and 
economic conditions.  
 ǯǡfocused on national-level lobbying to secure state support 
for the development of rural infrastructure and financial services, and there was a clear 
recognition among UCA management of the need to strengthen the production and 
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marketing conditions of cooperatives vis-à-vis TNCs. This primarily included direct 
efforts to improve access to rural financial services for cooperative members through the 
establishment of a cooperative financial system, as well as political lobbying for increased 
public investment in the rural production and storage infrastructure available to small 
producers. ǯ capacities at the national level, however were not 
matched at the secondary and local levels. ǯ-growing areas, 
local-level activities     ǯ  . This 
transferred technical agricultural skills and addressed cross-cutting issues such as 
gender equality, but did not cover political-economic knowledge about international 
coffee value chains and the relations of inequality in the wider economic environment 
that smallholders operate in. While this may have been caused by a lack of funds, rather 
than a limitation of the programǯǡǯ-level activities had 
limited, if not negligible effects on politicizing smallholders as an interest group. 
 
Gumutindo, which maintains no specialised lobbying capacities, focused exclusively on 
strengthening its competiveness vis-à-vis large buyers by expanding its international 
client network and diversifying its product range. The cooperative specializes in fair 
trade and organic coffee and sees itself as a socially responsible business, rather than an 
organization with a political agenda (interviews with managerial staff). Its economic 
success is based on a stable membership of roughly 10,000 farmer-members, long-term 
relationships with clients in coffee importing countries, and a range of specialty-coffees. 
Gumutindo applies socially responsible business guidelines, including minimum wages 
for seasonal workers and gender equality standards for members (Wedig, 2016). 
Although Gumutindoǯ growth strategy entailed no significant political lobbying, its 
success at the local level in raising awareness of broader political and economic issues, 
such as ǯ position within the global coffee value chain, is noteworthy. The 
organization has undertaken substantial efforts to educate individual members beyond 
the transfer of production-related agricultural skills. 
ǯ education 
programmes make political-economic issues accessible to smallholders with limited 
formal education. Furthermore, Gumutindo has addressed gender-based inequalities and 
has devoted organizational capacities at the secondary-level to advancing the   ǯ    developing international marketing 
strategies for exporting their coffee as Ǯǯ ǯ. The organization thereby 
directly supports women in increasing their control over cash income produced by their 
labour. By promoting the institutionalization of increased gender equality into their 
business strategy, Gumutindo encourages the development of a democratic and 
politicized organizational culture.  
 
Although pursuing different growth strategies, both UCA and Gumutindo have achieved 
a sustained growth of individual membership numbers and productive (rather than 
dormant) cooperative unions. However,  ǯ growth potential is 
challenged by the current political and economic conditions for cooperatives in Uganda. 
In the context of adverse terms of trade in international markets and overwhelming 
domestic export market control by few TNCs, both organizations lack sustained state 
support and neither is well-integrated in broader non-state institutional alliances, e.g. 
with civil society organizations or agricultural trade unions. In Uganda and throughout 
Africa, labour unions in rural areas are underdeveloped, but longstanding rural labour 
diversification (Bryceson, 1999) and the growth of rural labour markets (Oya, 2010b and 
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c) indicate a potential for expanding collective action if cooperatives were to reach out to 
labour organizations.  
 
BCU, with its coffee export monopoly for Eastern Uganda until the early 1990s, had built 
significant organizational capacities for political lobbying since its foundation (Bunker, 
1987). The organization     ǯ   and 
shaped the political and socio-cultural life of the region, despite its mixed performance 
record: contributions to socio-economic development were coupled with dynamics of 
political capture and rent seeking (Bunker, 1986). Since the 1990s, BCU went through a 
period of decline and subsequent revival. By 2014, rising numbers15 ǯ
then registered 296 societies, with approximately 1,500 coffee producers each, were 
selling secondary-processed coffee (graded green beans) through BCU again.  
 
An examination of BCU illuminates how the revival of a formerly monopolistic 
cooperative has taken place Ǯzǯ 
(Wiegratz, 2016). During the 1990s, BCU experienced serious economic difficulties and 
organizational failure due to the radical cutback of public sector support and significant 
internal mismanagement. ǯ then leadership (partly linked to the ruling 
NRM) was seen to enrich itself, engage in ambiguous economic activities and pay low 
prices to producers. According to older producers, which have worked with BCU during 
the 1990s, the cooperative increasingly failed altogether to pay its members. By the mid-
2000s, BCUǯlargely collapsed and the organization was unable to 
serve its debts.  
 
Also around that time, a numbers of actors started to challenge the corrupt organizational 
management and the state institutions responsible for allowing ǯ  while 
advancing the consolidation of dominant market control by a small number of TNCs. 
Consisting of producers, religious leaders (from Catholic, Protestant and Islamic groups), 
elders, and some politicians (including figures from the opposition), this broad-based 
alliance organized public consultations and sensitisation campaigns to investigate and  ǯ crisis.16 The initiative pressured the central government to investigate 
potential misconduct among BCU leaders and after an initially reluctant response by 
government officials, investigations were eventually conducted; they established the 
presence of fraud, forced the BCU leadership out of office and allowed for new elections 
by 2008.  
 
The subsequent revival of BCUǯȂ in a relationship of conflict, not harmony with 
the state - was a powerful expression of ǯstruggle for a non-neoliberal moral 
and political economy in their region (Wiegratz, 2010). Despite the central role of internal ǯǡwas a widespread perception among the ǯ smallholders that ǯ decline, and more generally that of cooperatives 
throughout the country, was advanced by the Ugandan state and international donors. 
Cooperative members and non-organized producers frequently expressed the view that 
                                            
15 Estimation by the authors, based on interviews with farmers and cooperative leaders, because no reliable 
documentation of the numbers of inactive/dormant societies existed. 
16 Earlier efforts in the late 1990s of some producers and supporters to enforce change in the leadership ǯǤ See Wiegratz (2016, chapters 4-9) for a detailed 
analysis of the political and moral economy of neoliberalized agricultural markets in Eastern Uganda, 
including the struggle for a revived BCU.  
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       ǯ   Ǯdivide and ruleǯǣ political 
domination by impoverishment Ǯ-ǯ. Also, ruling 
elites were widely believed to have links with foreign and domestic coffee buyers that 
benefited from weakened cooperatives (Wiegratz, 2016). Throughout Eastern Uganda, 
smallholders referred to the years following neoliberal reforms in agriculture as the ǮǯǤ The cooperative revival was thus shaped by perceptions of inherent 
problems between the government and cooperatives, and by memories of perceived 
attacks by the state and international actors on cooperative members (e.g. via the closure 
of Uganda Cooperative Bank). Thus, a-historical accounts of harmony between state and 
smallholders do not reflect the (perceived and/or actual) roles of the state, donors, and 
TNCs in turning the cooperative crisis into a near-terminal one. Smallholders, based on 
their own experience, perceived the attitudes and actual roles of all three players in the 
revival as ambiguous, uncertain and markedly different from accounts of international 
and state support of Ǯ-ǯ rural development.      
 
In interviews, producers characterized the ǯ    ǯ revival 
movement as hesitant, slow, or hostile.  ǯ financial resources, political 
intrigue and public pressure to influence the 2008 election of the chairman was widely 
assessed as constituting an unprecedented level of political interference in cooperative 
affairs. Yet, the NRM-backed candidate lost the election. ǯ newly elected chairman, 
Nathan Nandala Mafabi, was a regional political leader with a highly visible national-level 
political profile. As a top figure of the main opposition party Forum for Democratic Change 
(FDC), a Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee (2006-11), Leader of Opposition 
(LoP, 2011-14) in Parliament, and Secretary General of FDC (since 2015), he was a key ǯ Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, most notably 
in the 2011 presidential election, and also a business man. Among producers, he enjoyed 
a reputation of high integrity, competence, and commitment to ǯ interests. ǯ         members of the old 
management (e.g. via primary ǯpetitions) and some central government officials, 
but he was able to win the support of many NRM-leaning actors and regained ǯ
trust, many of whom started to supply coffee on credit by the next harvest season 
following his election. BCU also started to repay its debts and retrieved its export license. 
Export relations to China and Japan were established, and extension services, second-
payment and bonus systems, and a school bursary scheme for farmer-ǯchildren 
were revived. BCU also paid burial support and relief support to victims of natural 
disasters in the region. According to BCU management, the government did not provide 
substantial support to BCU and also donors showed little interest to engage with the 
cooperative up to-date.  
 
Despite the lack of ǯǡ
annual profits again by 2011. The organization was able to pass on to members large 
parts of increased coffee prices in international markets17, for which it was praised 
publicly. One commentator observed that "the farmer, who in the pre-Mafabi era earned 
about UGX 800 for his kilo of coffee, now gets UGX 6, 200. This price badly beats the one 
paid by private buyers who generously offered about UGX 2,500 before the dawn of [what 
was called]  ? ?ǳ by some producers (Sengoba, 2011). While the increased 
                                            
17 Coffee prices started to rise in 2005 and continued to rise until the second half of 2010, due to increased 
world consumption and several below-average harvests (ICO, accessed January 27, 2015). 
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prices paid to producers where made possible by rising world market prices, the ability 
and willingness of BCU to pass on increases triggered important changes in the local 
political economy by signalling to producers that it is not exclusively the remote Ǯǯ local price dynamics. Instead, the price politics of small producers 
suddenly appeared able to potentially pressurize dominant buyers in regional markets to 
increase their buying prices. Various interviewees highlighted that the prices paid to 
producers by middlemen and larger buyers are closely related to the level of strength of 
BCU as an actor in the economy.  Rather than primarily improving individual economic 
gains of farmer-members, the passing-on of higher international coffee prices under 
Mafabi directly contributed to strengthening the negotiation power of small producers as 
an interest group. 
 
A decisive state intervention in ǯ revival process   ǯ
recovery. In December 2010, shortly before the February 2011 presidential elections, the 
state suspended the new management on the basis of mismanagement allegations 
(balance sheet falsification), which were brought forward by parts of the old BCU 
leadership. The BCU board legally challenged the suspensionǡ    ǯ
declaration that the suspension was unlawful, the government installed a caretaker and 
a politico-legal battle of several years ensued in which claims concerning the (il-)legality 
of the actions of the various parties were made.  During the care-taking period, BCU 
operations were limited, prices negotiated with exporters and paid to producers low, and 
the caretaker team was accused of mishandling the unionǯ affairs and assets. The 
standard interpretation by producers and national media was that the state, more 
specifically the president, ǯ, particularly under 
the leadership of Mafabi. Despite being widely criticized for delaying the review process, 
the government took three and a half years to deliver the forensic audit report, which 
stated that there were some irregularities that needed follow-up.18  
 
Interview data suggests that there was indeed high-    Ǯǯ
evidence for wrongdoing, and undermine Mafabi. Notably, government officials argued 
that the delay was significantly due to the uncooperative behaviour of the BCU leadership, 
and that in any case, the responsible Ministry handled the case according to the 
provisions of the law. Furthermore, it was alleged that Mafabi and the FDC used BCU to 
receive foreign funding for political activities to oust Museveni (see also Daily Monitor, 
2011f).  The nationally and globally renowned political economist Dani Nabudere    ǣ ǲ  witnessed a number of military regimes in this 
country, and this one is just one of them. The union belongs to the farmers and they have 
authority over it. This [state action] is an indication that the government is committed to 
suffocate this union like it did to the other 41 unions that are now non-ǳ
(Sunday Monitor, 2011c). 
 
                                            
18 Ǯ
Nandala MafabiǯǤ
that the old board members account for the missing UGX 6 billion. ȏǥȐ Mr Mafabi maintains that 
government interference is responsible for some of these shortcomings. 'My term was interrupted after 
government forcefully took over the Union in 2010, we would have organised the union financially ȏǥȐǤǯ
(Daily Monitor 2014c). Further, tǮ
but asked him to reǯȋ, 2016). 
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The government eventually declared to support BCU as an engine of growth, jobs and 
state revenue and allowed for fresh election in 2014, which Mafabi won unopposed. 
However, the union was reportedly handed back indebted (Daily Monitor, 2014a, c, d, 
2011a-j, 2010, Sunday Monitor, 2014, 2013b, 2011a-c, 2010a-b, The Independent, 2011a-
b). Upon re-gaining the chairman post, Mafabi highlighted the financial implication for ǯ-ship and declared another round of legal 
struggles, among others, to alter the power relation between the state and cooperatives:  
 ǮǡǤ
Instead, the coffee prices that we left going for UGX 12,000 a kilo dropped to UGX 3,000. We left Shs2.5 
billion on the account when they threw me out. We expected to find that money or more, considering that 
we were collecting rent from our properties and charging milling fees. ȏǥȐ Instead, they have handed my 
board a union with the accounts in the negative. All they did ȏǥȐ was siphon our ǯ money. I am 
going to press for charges against the caretaker regime that has misappropriated that money. I will target 
the commissioner for cooperatives and others. We have also realised that the current law gives excess 
power to the commissioner for cooperatives and it is being abused. We are going to the courts to challenge Ǥǯȋ, 2014).19 
 ǯs case shows that the revival of a large cooperative in a neoliberal political economy, 
most notably the revival of a formerly monopolistic organization which is headed by a 
key (and popular) representative of the political opposition can be a politically highly 
sensitive matter, especially in a context where cooperatives have historically had ties 
with a then-ruling party ȋǯǡȌthat is currently in opposition 
(Wiegratz, 2016).  First, the revival can produce political and economic losses for actors 
that previously benefitted from the reduced activities or collapse of a cooperative with 
strong social rooting among producers. The political-economic and socio-economic 
changes associated with such a revival threaten the interests of dominant actors in a 
neoliberal environment. In Uganda, status quo benefactors included: (i) actors that 
participated in weakening the union, including fraudulent former ǯ  
who potentially face prosecutions, (ii) economic partners outside the coffee sector who 
might see a reduction of benefits enjoyed through the use of cooperative assets20, and (iii) 
those who face losses in market shares through strong cooperatives. The latter group 
includes competing domestic and foreign commodity buyers, politicians with little stake 
in a revived cooperative movement (but potentially in increased FDI), and even some 
NGOs and local government units that have found their niche in implementing 
development programmes for non-organized smallholders.  
 
Second, the revival of a large cooperative can undermine key components of the 
neoliberal political economy of agricultural trade: the extensive power of few TNCs in a 
                                            
19 According to BCU (2015; 2014), the caretaker did the following amongst others: formed his own coffee 
trading company and sold BCU coffee to it under dubious conditions; sold BCU coffee to other buyers 
(including a TNC) at a low price (and again under dubious conditions); borrowed money at a high rate from 
a private money lender; carried out extensive travel abroad on BCU expenses; made payments to old board 
membersǢ       ǯ     Ǣ 
significant tax benefits; left proceeds from coffee sales uncollected, and owed money to creditors including 
famers.  
20 BCU primary society premises were reportedly used as residential houses, police stations, schools and 
sub-county headquarters for instance (Daily Monitor 2015a). Trying to change the status quo here 
reportedly led to conflicts with powerful actors including cultural leaders that had allegedly used buildings 
without paying rent (e.g. Daily Monitor 2016c). 
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buyer-driven value chain, a fragmented and asset-poor peasantry,  ǯ
dependency on low farm-gate prices. A major cooperative with historically broad-based 
support among producers can be example-setting, thereby destabilizing the hegemony of 
neoliberal ideology. It may show the relative effectiveness of more egalitarian 
alternatives to agricultural production and marketing and economic practices more 
generally: the possibility of peasant actions that have an ambitious, long-term 
perspective and are guided by non-neoliberal principles, such as aiming at long-term 
economic improvements for the most vulnerable, running an economic organization that 
aims at collective action and unity of small producers to counter individualisation and 
fragmentation, substantive rather than pro-forma consultation of the peasantry, and Ǯǯof well-being (Wiegratz, 2016).   
 
A revival can therefore produce a range of material and ideational spill-over effects in 
other coffee producing regions, other agricultural sub-sectors, and potentially outside the 
agricultural sector, threatening neoliberal status quo interests there. A politically, 
economically and culturally more confident and less poverty-stricken peasantry (and 
potentially other actors, including agricultural labourers) may in turn incrementally 
challenge both the general conditions and concrete cases of (i) the subordination of Ǯǯby more powerful actors, including big capital and the various arms of the state, e.g. 
the judiciary and the police21, (ii) the political-economic deals between government/state 
and (especially foreign) big capital and the regular contempt there for the interests of the 
subaltern, and (iii) the fraud and corruption of powerful and predatory actors.  More 
generally, a cooperative can function as a vehicle for collective struggle of marginalised 
actors on various issues across society, economy and polity by increasing pressure on 
ruling classes/elites and engaging in the search for alternatives to neoliberal trajectories 
of development.  
 
Third, the BCU case demonstrates the key role played by the position that a state - and 
those that shape its key economic policies (including donors) Ȃ takes towards a 
cooperative revival. In Uganda, some sections of the state, e.g. the President/State House, 
at best favoured a revival on their own terms, i.e. with an NRM candidate as chairman, 
which ensures tightened political and economic ǯ. 
The case shows how certain ruling state elites may be opposed to a cooperative revival 
that strengthens permanent organizational structures to promote economic 
advancement and political emancipation at the expense of powerful political and 
economic actors, and the neoliberal development model and its political economy more 
broadly. Struggles for a cooperative revival, as this case confirmed, are not exclusively or 
even predominantly struggles for better prices and improved market access. Instead, 
they may seek structural changes in the political and economic power structures at local 
or regional levels, thereby re-shaping state-society relations in the affected regions.  
 
Lastly, the case indicates the various forms in which the state can interfere in a 
cooperative revival. Broader political-economic dynamics within Uganda, such as the fact 
that Mafabi was not the chief contender for the presidency in 2016, might shift the revival 
dynamics as the perceived threat to the status-quo, which emanates from the union, 
potentially decreases. The revival dynamic itself generates ever-new knock-on effects 
including rationales to question the status quo, such  ǯ  
                                            
21 Officials from both ǯǤ 
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challenge the government for its alleged actions during the caretaker period. The case 
also illuminates that individual state units, such as courts or sections of relevant 
Ministries and government agencies, both local and national, can formally and/or 
informally support or hinder certain aspects of a cooperative revival. The role of the state 
is not a-priori defined and cannot be theoretically assumed, but needs to be empirically 
investigated.  
 
The Ugandan case shows that Ǯǯstate, with a functional law and order sector, 
is potentially vulnerable and open to pressure through collective action. In the case of 
BCU, this pressure took the form of a long political campaign, with a sequence of defeats 
and setbacks that have their own impoverishment dynamics and a revival that is not at 
all fully secured against conflicting interests of the state and economic elites, and the 
pressing dynamics of market competition. The state however remains a powerful player 
that confronts a highly vulnerable and cash-strapped peasantry. A determined political 
leadership that recognizes the revival as a powerful political affair can indeed shape its 
length, terms and outcomes. In 2015, BCU with the support of the Bagisu Elders Forum, 
had secured a significant compensation payment from the government for the losses 
incurred during the 2009-14 caretaker period (9.2billions Ush of the estimated 15billion 
Ush; BCU used about half of the money to pay back debts and taxes accrued during the 
caretaker period.). While government officials denied that the payment was motivated by 
re-election concerns for the 2016 national elections (Daily Monitor, 2015b), the NRM 
government increased its control over cooperatives by tightening the rules for holding 
cooperative leadership posts (e.g. forbidding active politicians to hold such posts, 
arguably a response to the Mafabi case and an attempt to criminalise his BCU 
chairmanship after other routes to oust him failed), introducing term limits for leaders, 
and significantly extending the role of the military in managing the provision of 
agricultural inputs and extension servicesǡǮǯǡǯ-brother Salim Saleh (Daily 
Monitor, 2015b, 2015c, 2014f).  
 
In 2016, Mafabi was re-elected unopposed for a third term (and most of the board was 
also re-elected), and reported that BCU was free of debt again (Daily Monitor, 2016d). ǯ     ǣ    
committees have approached the Union to learn about it. Mafabi and the work of the 
board continued to be attacked, however, via petitions about BCU affairs that some 
societies, reportedly again backed by old board members, handed to the Ministry. A high-
level local NRM politician (District LCV chairman, and old board member) was 
prominently involved at the forefront of one of the cases in this latest flood of more than 
150 petitions (Daily Monitor, 2016a, 2016b). Arguably, these petitions gave various state 
agencies continuous reasons to interfere with BCU affairs. Union members and activists 
have pointed out that this constant state interference is a competitive disadvantage vis-
à-vis private companies (e.g. BCU 2014). It was also noted - in line with the long-standing 
call to keep politics out of union affairs - that cooperatives should not be seen to need 
mirroring national politics, i.e. reflect NRM dominance and preferences (e.g. on matters 
of board composition) (ibid). 
 
Further, BCU still struggled financially from the impact of the years-long, state-
orchestrated de-facto closure of the union, the potentially most potent institution of 
peasantry in the region to launch an attack on the entrenched neoliberal state power. The 
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NRM government, following the highly controversial 2016 re-election of Museveni, made 
further inroads on co-opting large producer organizationsǤ    Ǯǯ
cooperatives (with support of international donors), it announced amongst others a 
process of compensating unions for damages occurred in relation to the civil war in the 
1980s that brought the NRM to power (Daily Monitor, 2016e). This sort of political 
practice of promising and/or making substantial payments to larger groups is widely 
regarded as a buying of support or providing patronage Ǯǯ
the government, i.e. a form of power reproduction.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Against the background of the internationally promoted cooperative revival in Africa, this 
article has examined the conditions for cooperative development in a neoliberal 
economic and political environment. ǯ
pointed to major difficulties for a sustained revival of cooperatives due to the challenges ǯ. The increased 
social and economic risks, costs and vulnerabilities that producers are confronted with 
have created serious barriers to the revival and growth of cooperatives. Major economic 
factors that reduce the likelihood of asset-poor producers to organize in cooperatives 
include the decline in the provision of rural financial services after the dissolution of 
cooperative banks, high transport and storage costs due to the loss of state-supported 
facilities, low levels of public investment in rural infrastructure, and elevated investment 
risks due to significant price fluctuations in international commodity markets.  
 
Overall, the balance sheet of neoliberal reforms seems to be negative for a large section 
of producers in Ugandaǯ. As a result of the rapid and extensive opening of 
domestic agricultural markets to  Ǯ ǯ , smallholders face higher 
production and marketing costs and are less able to access financial services. Many lack 
the capacities to insure themselves against high risks in international markets, and they 
are often unable to respond to international market price incentives due to a lack of 
savings and access to capital.  ǯealth and education 
sectors, even the poorest population sections still face financial costs for basic services, 
and uneven public service delivery translates into higher costs in remote rural areas. 
Given the reduced access to capital experienced by small producers in a neoliberal 
environment Ȃ and the simultaneous need to insure against higher risks Ȃ the 
requirement to bear any costs for basic social services is significant and may push farm 
households into short-term selling to middlemen or increase side-selling among 
organized producers. 
 
While the pace and extent of market liberalization and neoliberal reforms more generally 
have differed between African countries, some of the above described political and 
economic barriers to economic (re)organization can be relevant to small producers 
outside Uganda. The strategies of cooperatives to overcome these barriers differ between 
organizations, but the evidence presented has shown that larger cooperatives with the 
institutional capacities to engage in political struggles, including lobbying at the national 
level, are under certain conditions more likely to press for changes in market regulation 
and other state support to improve the terms of trade faced by organized smallholders. 
The Ugandan data showed that middle-sized cooperatives without national-level 
organizational structures can realize improvements in the economic prospects of 
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vulnerable groups locally, but it seems to be beyond their capacities and organizational 
agenda to organize producers as a force for political and economic change. Such 
cooperatives may follow a progressive business model that includes the promotion of 
gender equality and living wages, but as single entrepreneurial entities, they are unlikely 
to act as a social and political force that engages with the state to increase the policy space 
of and state support for cooperatives.  
 
 The Ugandan data also points to the weak nature or lack of alliances among cooperatives 
and between cooperatives and other non-state actors, such as trade unions and small 
business organizations. Though difficult to forge in the current state of survival, which 
for cooperatives like BCU is dominated by struggles with the state, other actors opposed 
to the current revival trajectory (e.g. old board members) and powerful competitors,  
such alliances are necessary if cooperatives are to regain policy space and push for 
structural changes necessary to improve their terms of trade in liberalized agricultural 
markets.  
 
Finally, our analysis has highlighted the ways in which the revival of cooperatives is a 
contested process that is characterized by conflicting interests and struggles over 
political power and economic support. Analytical accounts within the mainstream of 
academic and policy debates largely fail to capture this key aspect of cooperatives in 
contemporary Africa and are thus reproducing analytical flaws that hamper the 
understanding of agricultural development in Africa. The discourse on cooperatives that 
is dominated by a representation of the social and solidarity economy (SSE) that idealizes 
the integration of small producers into global value chains and projects notions of win-
win scenarios in liberalized agricultural markets22 amount to misrepresentations of 
African social reality. As a disservice to the core actor group that wages a battle for 
socially progressive economic development against the status quo, it distorts the serious 
risks and difficulties that smallholders face in challenging TNCs, large domestic buyers, 
and the state.  
  
                                            
22 See Wedig (forthcoming 2018) for a critique of the SSE discourse in the context of African export 
agriculture. 
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